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Modeling without Representation1 
Alistair M. C. Isaac 
 
Abstract 
How can mathematical models which represent the causal structure of the 
world incompletely or incorrectly have any scientific value?  I argue that 
this apparent puzzle is an artifact of a realist emphasis on representation in 
the philosophy of modeling.  I offer an alternative, pragmatic methodology 
of modeling, inspired by classic papers by modelers themselves.  The crux 
of the view is that models developed for purposes other than explanation 
may be justified without reference to their representational properties.  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
 The increasing popularity of mathematical and computer-based methods in 
science has inspired a growing interest in the epistemological status of models (Godfrey-
Smith, 2006; Weisberg, 2007b).  At the heart of this interest is a puzzle about how 
modeling works as a form of scientific reasoning.  For example, a simple model of a 
market treats it as a competition between agents acting solely to maximize their expected 
utilities.  But real human beings are not in fact utility maximizers (as demonstrated by 
many experiments, e.g. the ultimatum game, Camerer and Thaler, 1995).  How then 
should we interpret this model of a market?  Its assumptions seem to be false, but what 
possible scientific use could a fallacious model have? 
 This is the classic epistemological puzzle of modeling, a puzzle which arises 
when models are contrasted with the realist ideal for a scientific theory.  Good theories 
are true, or veridically represent the world, and it is in virtue of this representation that 
they succeed in explaining natural phenomena.  In contrast, models (frequently) fail to 
veridically represent the causal structure of the world, so how can they explain?  A realist 
                                                 
1 “Representation” is used throughout to mean the relationship between the assumptions of a model and the 
world, which I take to be the sense employed by Weisberg when he argues that the “essential” feature of 
modeling is that it “involves indirect representation and analysis of real world phenomena” (2007b, 209–
10).  This should not be confused with the mathematical sense of “representation” as characterized by 
representation theorems, see Section 3 for further discussion. 
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strategy for resolving this puzzle might attempt to justify the impoverished 
representational features of models, perhaps beginning with an analysis of the 
explanatory properties of idealizations (Weisberg, 2007a), or an account of how false 
models converge on true ones (Wimsatt, 1987).  The present project outlines and defends 
an alternative strategy, one which sidesteps questions about representation and instead 
justifies modeling practice pragmatically. 
 I maintain that the classic puzzle rests upon a tenuous assumption, one entrenched 
in the realist perspective, but unnecessary and unwarranted in the context of modeling.  
This assumption is that successful science depends upon successful representation.  On 
this view, the justification of modeling as a scientific practice must ultimately rest upon 
an analysis of how models represent: representation is conceptually prior to success.  
Ironically, this attitude runs contrary to the pragmatic methodology expressed in classic 
papers by modelers themselves (Section 2).  I analyze an example of a model with purely 
pragmatic success conditions in Section 3 before returning to the question of explanation 
in Section 4.  The recognition that explanation is just one amongst many goals of 
modeling motivates a new interpretation of the classic puzzle. 
 I think the main resistance to a pragmatic methodology of modeling is a supposed 
conflict with realism about scientific theories.  If our realism forces us to build our 
account of all scientific practice upon representation, then we cannot accept a purely 
pragmatic methodology of modeling.  In Section 5, I argue that there is no actual 
inconsistency here.  We can have our representational cake and eat it too, so long as we 
endorse a pluralism about scientific practice.  Not only can pragmatism and realism 
peacefully coexist as responses to distinct scientific methods, but the relationship 
between these methods is clarified by acknowledging that they rest upon distinct 
foundations.   
 
2.  A Pragmatic Methodology of Modeling 
 
 The foundations of a discipline explain and justify its practices.  What explains 
and justifies the practice of modeling?  The answer I defend here ties models to specific 
functions and judges the success of a model, i.e. justifies the practice of building it, in 
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terms of its success at fulfilling its specific function.  Examples of functions I have in 
mind are things like (i) generating testable predictions; (ii) offering a policy 
recommendation; or (iii) demonstrating how an unexpected phenomenon is possible.  
From this perspective, models are more akin to tools than theories and accordingly are 
judged by their success at getting the (relevant) job done.2  This pragmatic methodology 
has precursors in the influential methodological writings of Milton Friedman (1953) and 
Richard Levins (1966).  
 
2.1.  Richard Levins 
 
 Population biologist Richard Levins defends a pragmatic methodology in his 
influential article, “The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology” (1966), 
which argues that model building necessarily involves a tradeoff amongst three 
competing desiderata: realism, generality, and precision.  Levins appears to treat these 
three desiderata symmetrically: realism does not have a privileged status, it is just one 
property a model might have more or less of.  This interpretation is supported by Levins’ 
remarks on model evaluation: “The validation of a model is not that it is ʻtrueʼ but that it 
generates good testable hypotheses relevant to important problems” (430).  So, the 
success of a model is assessed pragmatically, in the context of a particular problem, and 
does not directly depend on truth, or representational success.3   
 Levins identifies three goals of modeling: “understanding, predicting, and 
modifying nature” (422).  The extent to which one reads Levins as defending a pragmatic 
methodology depends crucially on whether one takes these goals to be independently 
satisfiable.  If so, then a model might be validated by success at prediction or 
modification without an antecedent assessment of its contribution to understanding.  The 
justification of such a model would not need to appeal to its representational properties. 
                                                 
2 Morrison and Morgan (1999) make a similar point when they stress that models should be understood as 
“autonomous,” and that “what it means for a model to function autonomously is to function like a tool or 
instrument” (11).  Note that while Morrison and Morgan emphasize the question of “representation” in 
understanding modeling success, they use this term in a broader sense than Weisberg and Godfrey-Smith, 
covering not only the model–world relation, but also the model–theory relation.  
3 Jay Odenbaugh (2006) has also stressed the pragmatism of Levins (1966), but Odenbaugh's claim and 
mine are different. He argues that the “necessity” of tradeoffs for Levins is pragmatic, not logical.  I wish to 
emphasize the pragmatic nature of model evaluation in Levins, a different, though perhaps related, point. 
 4 
This interpretation of Levins (1966) is somewhat heterodox.  A more mainstream 
reading (e.g. Weisberg, 2006) takes the goal of understanding to have special status 
(625).  Since understanding follows from explanations and explanations must be 
veridical, representation plays a fundamental role in modeling methodology (624).  On 
this account, when realism is traded off against generality and precision, the importance 
of representation for evaluating a model is not also diminished.  Instead, the modeler 
adopts a different “representational ideal” (633); she does not abandon fit with reality as a 
virtue, she merely changes the standards by which she assesses this fit. 
My claim is not that Levins abandons realism, representational adequacy, or 
explanatory value as norms of modeling.  The point is rather a more subtle one, about 
emphasis and conceptual priority.  Levins (1966) deemphasizes realism and truth (and, 
consequently, representational adequacy) in favor of pragmatic considerations such as the 
generation of testable hypotheses.4  One possible response to this shift in emphasis is a 
corresponding shift in priority, placing pragmatic considerations prior to representational 
considerations.  This radical position has been explicitly defended by Milton Friedman. 
 
2.2.  Milton Friedman 
 
 Milton Friedman’s “The Methodology of Positive Economics” (1953) served as a 
manifesto for the “Chicago School” and a target for its critics.  Friedman defends an 
extreme pragmatic methodology for the practice of mathematical modeling.  The 
caricature statement of his view is that models should not be judged by the realism of 
their assumptions, but only by the success of their predictions.  A model of a market of 
interacting utility maximizers should be judged by its ability to predict the behavior of 
actual markets, not by the truth or falsity of its assumptions about agents. 
 This rather extreme reading of the article has been somewhat tempered by 
historical work into its origins.  Daniel Hammond (2008), for example, ably argues that 
Friedman was responding to a trend in economic modeling which ignored any contact 
                                                 
4 The exact import of this shift in emphasis for Levins’ own research is unclear.  Chapter 1 of Levins 
(1968) appears to support Weisberg’s interpretation as it characterizes the practice of model building as one 
of abstracting from reality, though it still emphasizes that model validation always occurs relative to a 
specific purpose.  Conversely, the conclusion of Levins and Lewontin (1985) defends a holistic and anti-
reductionist worldview at odds with traditional conceptions of realism.  
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between models and empirical data.  His ultimate position should not be interpreted as 
rejecting the value of realistic assumptions altogether (as these represent one contact with 
empirical data), but rather as emphasizing the importance of the comparison between 
predictions and data over and above that between assumptions and data.  On this view, a 
model with unrealistic assumptions which accurately predicts economic behavior would 
have more value than a model with realistic assumptions which nevertheless fails to 
generate accurate predictions, but a model with both realistic assumptions and accurate 
predictions might in some contexts trump them both. 
 The crux of Friedman’s argument is the claim that it is wrong to interpret the 
degree of realism of a model’s assumptions as an independent source of evidence for the 
model.  Conceptually, there is just one relationship between model and data, and 
predictive success should outweigh any supposed “falsity” of assumptions.  
 
[T]he relevant question to ask about the “assumptions” of a theory is not 
whether they are descriptively “realistic,” for they never are, but whether 
they are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand.  And 
this question can be answered only by seeing whether the theory works, 
which means whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions.  The two 
supposedly independent tests thus reduce to one test. (15) 
 
Friedman later clarifies his use of the term “theory,” stating it includes an “abstract 
model” plus “a set of rules” defining the model’s representational properties (24).  The 
determination of which features of the model count as assumptions and which as 
implications will be found in these rules.  Crucially, however, they cannot all be 
explicitly stated, and will in general vary with context.  According to Friedman, the 
distinction between assumption and implication “is not . . . a characteristic of the 
hypothesis as such but rather of the use to which the hypothesis is to be put” (26).   
 Although we could simply read Friedman as defending a general 
instrumentalism,5 I think it is more constructive to see him as arguing particularly about 
the status of models.  Certainly, he is responding to many of the same issues which 
                                                 
5 E.g. a “methodological instrumentalism” (Caldwell, 1982).  Friedman has also been identified as a realist, 
however, e.g. Mäki, 2009.  In assessing the implications of Friedman, 1953, for philosophy of science 
generally, it is important to remember that modeling is only one facet of his research; the other is data 
collection in the form of diachronic case studies.  For a discussion of this side of Friedman’s methodology, 
and a reading of his methods as a response to the Duhem-Quine thesis, see Schliesser, 2012. 
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motivated Levins: the complexity of the phenomena, the limitations of human 
computational abilities, the apparent necessity of tradeoffs between accuracy and 
generality, the distance between mathematics and physical reality, etc.  Insofar as Levins 
and Friedman are addressing the same issues in scientific practice, they seem to agree 
that the measure of a model is in its implications, not in the realism (or lack thereof) of its 
assumptions.   
 On Friedman’s view, a model can only be assessed in the context of a particular 
use or purpose.  And in this context, it is evaluated in terms of its success at fulfilling that 
purpose.  What then justifies constructing a model with unrealistic or fallacious 
assumptions?  Simply that it gets the job done.  A model of interacting utility maximizers 
is nothing more than math if considered in a vacuum.  If an economist uses it to predict 
the effects of a change in tax policy on the price of gas, then it has a context and a 
function.  If this function is fulfilled, then the model is validated.   
 
3.  An Example: Full-Employment Policy 
  
 Let’s look at an example of modeling from Friedman’s own research to see how a 
model might be validated without reference to its truth or representational status.  We’ll 
see that Friedman’s model is validated by its success at analyzing a set of concepts 
relevant to policymakers.  This analysis might plausibly be recast as an instance of 
mathematical “representation,”6 but its success does not depend in any way on a 
representational relationship with the world.  In fact, as a quick examination of 
subsequent literature demonstrates, the model may be taken to represent different features 
of the world, and with more or less success, without undermining its pragmatic success as 
a piece of concept analysis. 
                                                 
6 A mathematical “representation theorem” proves for an axiomatically defined set of structures that every 
structure is isomorphic to one in a distinguished subset.  In measurement theory, for example, a 
representation theorem can be used to show that every structure which satisfies the axioms of a ratio scale 
is isomorphic to the real line, thereby justifying our use of real numbers to represent the outcomes of 
measurements of length.  Note that this notion of representation does not hold between a model and the 
world (since the world is not axiomatically defined), but holds rather between two (sets of) models.  
Friedman’s argument could be recast as involving this type of representation if the concepts of instability 
and intervention are given an axiomatic characterization.  For an extended discussion of the role of 
representation theorems in the philosophy of science see Suppes, 2002. 
 7 
 
3.1. The Model 
 
Friedman (1951) purports to address “full-employment policy,” i.e. policy 
measures aimed at achieving 100% employment.  Very rapidly, however, the article turns 
to abstract questions about the efficacy of countercyclic interventions on cyclic 
phenomena: 
Under what conditions will countercyclical action succeed in its objective 
of reducing instability?  Under what conditions will it actually increase 
instability?  How does its effectiveness depend on the magnitude of 
action?  What is the optimum magnitude of countercyclical action?  (117) 
 
Friedman notes that currently popular models of the relation between employment and 
government expenditure (his primary target: a 1949 report to the United Nations) do not 
include temporal dynamics and so cannot be used to address these questions.  This 
motivates the introduction of a new model.  
 Friedman’s model treats income and the effect of policy on income as arbitrary 
functions evolving in time.  Since his motivating questions involve stability and 
fluctuation rather than directed trends, he assumes these functions have a stable expected 
value at all times.  He takes the variance 
€ 
σ 2 (the square of the standard deviation) as a 
measure of the magnitude of fluctuations.  The general equation, then, is  
Z(t) = X(t) + Y(t), 
where X(t) is income in the absence of a full-employment policy, Y(t) is the effect at time 
t of the policy (not the effect of measures taken at time t, but the effect at t of action 
already taken), and Z(t) is total income (122).  He can now rephrase his initial questions 
about the efficacy of countercyclic intervention as questions about the relationship 
between the variances of X, Y, and Z: 
 
Under what conditions will the variance of Z (
€ 
σ Z
2 ) be less than the 
variance of X (
€ 
σX
2 ), so that the countercyclical policy succeeds in its 
objective of reducing instability?  Under what conditions will 
€ 
σ Z
2  exceed 
€ 
σX
2 ?  How does the difference between 
€ 
σ Z
2  and 
€ 
σX
2  depend on the 
magnitude of countercyclical action, that is, on 
€ 
σY
2?  What is the optimum 
size of 
€ 
σY
2?  (123) 
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The key insight for answering these questions is that the variance of the sum of 
two variables depends upon their degree of correlation.  In this case, the relevant formula 
is 
€ 
σ Z
2 =σX
2 +σY
2 + 2rXYσXσY , 
where 
€ 
rXY  is the correlation coefficient of X and Y.  As we would expect, if correlation is 
positive (
€ 
rXY > 0), then fluctuations in Y reinforce fluctuations in X and instability 
increases.  If there is no correlation between interventions and fluctuations in income  
(
€ 
rXY = 0), the variances of X and Y simply sum and intervention again increases 
instability.  The crucial point of interest is that interventions may be negatively correlated 
with fluctuations in income as desired (
€ 
rXY < 0) and yet still increase instability.  A simple 
transformation of this equation, division by 
€ 
σX
2 , allows for more transparent analysis. 
€ 
σ Z
2
σX
2 =1+
σY
2
σX
2 + 2rXY
σY
σX
 
Countercyclic intervention has a positive effect, i.e. decreases instability, whenever 
€ 
σ Z
2 <σX
2 , or whenever the left side of this equation is less than 1.  This allows us to 
compute the answer to our first question, namely the conditions under which 
countercyclic policy succeeds, or those values of 
€ 
rXY  which ensure 
€ 
σ Z
2 <σX
2 .  Whenever  
€ 
−1< rXY < −
σY
2σX
 
the effects of the policy are stabilizing, and whenever  
€ 
−
σY
2σX
< rXY < +1 
the effects are destabilizing (124–5).  Similar manipulations answer the rest of the 
questions on Friedman’s list. 
 Friedman’s article concludes with a discussion of the implications of his analysis 
for policy.  The two variables affected by policy are 
€ 
σY , average magnitude of the 
intervention, and 
€ 
rXY , degree of correlation with fluctuations in income.  He gives a 
precise characterization of how these relate to each other and to 
€ 
σX , including an optimal 
value for 
€ 
σY  given a value for 
€ 
rXY , and vice versa.  He emphasizes that static models of 
full-employment policy such as the 1949 U.N. model tacitly assume reaction to 
 9 
fluctuations is instantaneous (i.e. that 
€ 
rXY = −1), or that a very low 
€ 
rXY  can be ensured by 
predicting with great accuracy “both the behavior of the system in the absence of action 
and the effect of action.”  As Friedman points out, “to date there is no reason for 
confidence in our ability to make such predictions” (129). 
Nevertheless, once we acknowledge the difficulty in predicting fluctuations in 
employment, we can develop a positive strategy for lowering 
€ 
rXY , and thereby succeed at 
the goal of stabilizing income. 
Whereas one method of controlling 
€ 
rXY  is to change the kind of action 
taken, another method is to limit the objective.  The effect of action is 
clearly likely to be in the right direction much more frequently if action is 
taken to counteract only substantial movements in income than if it is 
taken to counteract mild movements as well.  In the case of substantial 
movements the lag between action and its effects is likely to be much 
shorter relative to the movement itself—even if not in absolute terms—
than for mild movements, and so 
€ 
rXY  is likely to be greater.  (131) 
 
Since a large fluctuation in income takes longer than a small fluctuation, our response to 
it is more likely to occur relatively early during the fluctuation, and therefore the degree 
of correlation will be closer to 
€ 
−1. 
 
3.2. Validating Friedman’s Model 
 
 What is the relationship between the representational properties of this model and 
its success?  Does the classic puzzle arise for this model?  Friedman’s model does indeed 
“falsely” represent the world: X represents changes in income independent of 
intervention, Y represents the effect of interventions on income, yet these are certainly not 
the only two factors which determine total income.  Nevertheless, I think it misinterprets 
Friedman’s endeavor to put any evaluative weight on the model’s representational 
properties.  There is no puzzle about how the model succeeds despite representing the 
world falsely since the standards for assessing its success have nothing to do with its 
accuracy in representing the world. 
 To see this, let’s look at where Friedman’s model comes from.  The mathematical 
model Friedman proposes is nothing more than an attempt to make precise the concepts 
of cyclic and countercyclic activity.  One can see this by comparing Friedman’s general 
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questions about countercyclic policy with his questions about the relationship between 
the variances of X, Y, and Z.  So, one step in the modeling practice, a step which requires 
validation, is the characterization of cyclic activity as fluctuations in the value of an 
arbitrary function.  The validation of this step is purely a matter of concept analysis. 
 The second step for validating Friedman’s model addresses the relationship 
between the abstract questions he asks and policy choice.  The pertinent question here is 
not whether income actually fluctuates or whether these fluctuations correlate with 
employment.  Rather, the crucial issue is whether policy makers perceive full-
employment policy as a countercyclic corrective to fluctuations in income.  If a match 
obtains between Friedman’s theoretical characterization of the problem and the 
policymakers’ perception of the problem, then his analysis succeeds in placing 
constraints on reasonable policy choice.  This step is validated empirically, but does not 
require an assessment of the match between model and world. 
 Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess this empirical question.  Large scale policy 
decisions are often made by committee (in the United States, for example, the twelve 
member Federal Open Market Committee), and while committee members may agree on 
the particular policy to implement, they may not agree on the rationale which justifies 
said policy (Friedman and Kuttner, 1996, 81).  Nevertheless, we can find some measure 
of the success of Friedman’s model by looking at its treatment in the subsequent literature 
on public policy.  While that literature treats the model as successful at analyzing the 
limited set of concepts it considers, it has since acknowledged that a richer set of 
concepts is needed to address the concerns of policymakers.  
 Friedman’s model supplemented previous analyses by explicitly considering the 
relevance of temporal dynamics for policy efficacy.  Optimal policies of the sort 
considered by Friedman were soon recognized as implausible in the face of policymaker 
uncertainty, however, motivating the explicit inclusion of the expected rather than actual 
effects of interventions in the model.7  Once policymaker uncertainty was explicitly 
considered, however, it was natural to take the further step of considering their risk 
aversion as well.  Mitchell (1979), for example, defends a model which explicitly 
                                                 
7 Brainard, 1967, 411.  Brainard does not explicitly cite Friedman, but he takes a model equivalent to 
Friedman’s (his equation (3)) as a starting point for his analysis. 
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includes risk aversion; Friedman’s model falls out as a special case.  So, as the optimal 
policy literature has developed, Friedman’s analysis has become a small part in a richer 
analysis of a much more sophisticated network of concepts. 
 It is important to emphasize that the development of this literature would be 
incoherent if its methodology were founded on representation.  The reason is that this 
sequence of modeling decisions depends on an equivocation between variance in the 
world and variance in the policymakers’ access to information about the world.8  To 
supplement Friedman’s model, a model supposedly illustrating fluctuations in income, 
with parameters which characterize risk aversion, a property of policymakers, is to mix 
apples and oranges from a representational standpoint.  From the standpoint of concept 
analysis, however, there is no problem.  The basic irrelevance of representation here is 
further illustrated by the fact that Friedman’s model is treated as one of optimal 
intervention on a fluctuating system; the question of employment policy in particular is 
simply ignored. 
 Of course, Friedman’s model might also be applied in an empirical context, at 
which point its representational properties do become important.  An example here is 
Friedman and Kuttner (1996), who perform a longitudinal analysis of U.S. monetary 
policy in the 1970s and 80s, asking why the Federal Reserve appears to have ignored a 
Congressional mandate from 1975 requiring it to explicitly set monetary growth targets.  
Two of the potential answers they consider are motivated by Friedman’s model.  In order 
to derive explanations for the observed data from the model, they take 
€ 
σ Z
2  to represent 
prices (measured, e.g., by GDP), 
€ 
σX
2  to represent money supply, and 
€ 
σY
2  to represent the 
effect of Federal Reserve interventions on money supply.  Once this representation is 
locked in, Friedman’s model turns out to fail as an explanation of the efficacy of U.S. 
monetary policy.  Not because it fails as a conceptual analysis (Friedman and Kuttner 
acknowledge the model makes a valuable, if incomplete, policy point, 104–5), but 
because an empirical relationship between prices and money supply which used to obtain 
now no longer does.  Friedman and Kuttner conclude this is because money demand, a 
factor not explicitly represented in Friedman’s model, has become unstable. 
 
                                                 
8 C.f. a related discussion in Brainard, 1967, 412–3. 
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 In sum, the claim is not that representation plays no part in Friedman’s model, but 
rather that the classic puzzle does not arise because the model’s success conditions do not 
include veridical representation.  In the literature on public policy, it constitutes one in a 
sequence of increasingly sophisticated models, all justified by their pragmatic success at 
analyzing the network of concepts relevant to policy makers.  In empirical contexts, these 
models may be given a specific interpretation, and their success or failure at the goal of 
explaining the data may then depend upon their representational adequacy. 
 
4.  Explanation: One Goal Amongst Many 
 
 The pragmatic methodology of modeling on offer here won’t work for models 
which are intended as explanations.  This is because explanations have a normative 
status—they can be correct or incorrect.  Not so with many of the pragmatically 
evaluated purposes to which models are put, e.g. generating testable predictions or policy 
recommendations.  Testable predictions may be interesting or not, though this is a matter 
of opinion.  In the context of the day to day life of a laboratory, however, it is having a 
prediction to test which is important, its correctness or not is determined ex post facto by 
the test itself.  Even false predictions can be of value: the discrepancy between the rate of 
precession of the perihelion of Mercury predicted by Newtonian models and that which 
was observed provided evidence for general relativity, but it was evidence which could 
not be discovered without the precise calculations of Newtonian theory.  Arguably, this 
discrepancy should be treated not just as a success for general relativity (in explaining it 
away), but also for Newtonian gravity, which succeeded in identifying it in the first 
place.9 
 Policy recommendations are similar.  Of course, there are good and bad policy 
choices, but determining which is which is largely a matter of hindsight.  So long as there 
is agreement on the goal to be achieved, there is no meaningful empirical standard by 
which to assess a policy recommendation other than its ex post facto success in achieving 
                                                 
9 See discussion in Smith, 2002, especially p. 157; c.f. the general comparison between Newton’s and 
Friedman’s methodologies in Schliesser, 2005. 
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that goal.  Consider, for example, two models of the earth’s climate: one which has 
realistic assumptions (i.e. reflects our best theories of the causal interaction between local 
heat, wind change, ice albedo, width of ozone layer, etc.) but is poor at matching 
historical data, and a second which matches historical data much better, but contains 
arbitrary, uninterpreted parameters.  Which is better as a model for guiding climate 
policy?  A climatologist will say the first, a statistician, the second, but a politician is 
interested in the one which correctly predicts the outcome of her policy choice.  By what 
criterion then should she choose between the two?  Ideally we’d like a model which both 
reflects our causal knowledge and accurately predicts.  If we don’t have that, we are in 
the realm of Levins and Friedman, where the world is too complex, human limitations too 
great, and the best we can do is tradeoff amongst criteria of interest.  In this case, the only 
definitive constraint is that parameters representing the intervention of the possible policy 
change must be present in the model.  Beyond that, the question of how to determine the 
right model to trust appears to be extra-scientific. 
 Even in the case of explanation, the pragmatic approach can get a toehold.  Of 
course, ultimately, we’d like our explanations to be true, and this means they accurately 
represent reality.  But in many contexts, we are satisfied with something weaker, a “how 
possibly” explanation.  And here, again, there is no question of correctness, but merely of 
pragmatic success: a “how possibly” explanation may sound plausible, or generate new 
predictions, or simply get the questioner to stop asking questions.  Of course, a “how 
possibly” explanation may turn out to describe how actually; or it may not.  But its 
success as a “how possibly” explanation is distinct from this future status it may one day 
attain, and must be evaluated differently. 
 Is this justification of modeling practice too quick?  A mere sleight of hand which 
avoids the hard questions?  Don’t be fooled by this cursory discussion, there is much left 
to be done, but the methodological project which prioritizes contexts and purposes looks 
quite different from that which prioritizes representation.  Rather than a taxonomy of 
representational ideals, we will need a taxonomy of context-sensitive scientific goals, and 
an analysis of the evaluative criteria used in each.  The pragmatic methodology of 
modeling is not a quick fix, it is merely a different starting point for the journey.  It does 
not ignore the “hard questions,” but merely recasts them in a different foundational role. 
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5. Can We be Pragmatists about Models, but Realists about Theories? 
 
 I argued above that the test of a good model is that it works, that it does the job 
for which it was intended.  Does this view necessarily lead to a thoroughgoing 
instrumentalism?  If we reject a foundational role for representation in our methodology 
of modeling, are we thereby led to reject it in our philosophy of science as a whole?  I 
think the answer to this question depends crucially on the status of models within 
scientific practice.  If models are only one type of scientific construct amongst many, we 
can consistently maintain pragmatism about modeling and realism (or some other view, if 
we wish) about other aspects of the scientific endeavor. 
 Of course, the view that all scientific theories are just models (the semantic view) 
was quite popular in the latter half of the 20th century.  In order to be coherent, however, 
this view must mean something quite different by “model” than either Levins or 
Friedman, both of whom use the term solely for sets of mathematical equations.10  In fact, 
it was to some degree dissatisfaction with the semantic view, and a shift towards 
pluralism about scientific practice, which motivated the modern turn toward modeling 
(see especially Godfrey-Smith, 2006).  So, at least in the context of the present debate, 
there seems to be no inconsistency in maintaining a pragmatic foundation for modeling, 
but a realist foundation for theories as the outcome of scientific inquiry more broadly 
construed. 
 What is the status, then, of questions about how models represent?  On the 
account developed here, the direction of the classic puzzle is reversed.  The classic puzzle 
asks: given that a model is false, how can we explain its success?  The methodological 
pragmatist asks: given that a model is successful, what can it tell us about the world?  If 
there is a representational discrepancy between a model and our theory of reality, then the 
                                                 
10 Historically, the semantic view has meant something different, although its history is one of debate 
about how to characterize the notion of “model” and what role models should play in philosophy of 
science.  Originally, “model” was meant in the logical sense of a set-theoretical structure (Suppes, 1960).  
More recently, the literature has turned toward a looser notion of model, in part because the set-theoretic 
notion was inadequate for characterizing the theory-world relationship (Giere, 1988).  The crucial point for 
the present discussion, however, is just that modeling as a practice (and as discussed by Levins and 
Friedman) is not a plausible account of the full diversity of scientific theorizing. 
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model’s pragmatic success should cause us to question the supposed truth of that theory!   
 Of course, some of this discussion of “truth” and “falsity” is overblown.  
Experiments such as the ultimatum game show us that humans are not utility maximizers 
in the limit.  They do not necessarily undermine the claim that humans approximate 
utility maximizers.  We might resolve the apparent conflict between a successful model 
of an economy which assumes humans are utility maximizers and the “fact” that they are 
not with some suitably qualified view, for instance that in large-scale systems of 
economic interaction, the only feature of human behavior relevant for generating correct 
predictions is that it approximates utility maximization.11 
 The possibility that a strictly false model might shed light on the current state of 
our knowledge of the world should not be underestimated, however.  The initial reaction 
to Newton’s theory of gravity was that it posited an impossible, and therefore fallacious, 
mechanism.  Intelligent men had learned that action at a distance was not possible.  The 
arguments were logically sound, the reasoning incontrovertible.  Newton’s theory then 
must be false; hence attempts, e.g. by Leibniz, to reconstruct it without the action at a 
distance.  In the end, Friedman’s criterion, empirical success, won out.  We did not revise 
Newton’s theory because of its “false” assumptions, we revised our “knowledge” of the 
world because of its success.   
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
 Even if the ultimate aim of science is explanation, along the way in day to day 
practice there are many subgoals and practical tasks to be achieved.  Models are 
frequently employed to solve these tasks, and their success or failure at the task at hand is 
both the measure of their value and the justification of their design.  If a discrepancy 
exists between the assumptions of a model and some assumed feature of reality, that 
certainly constitutes a puzzle: not necessarily a puzzle about the model’s success, 
                                                 
11 This is Friedman's answer.  It is closely related to Weisberg (2007a)’s “minimalist idealization”—note, 
however, that the direction of the reasoning is different.  For Weisberg an idealization is “the intentional 
introduction of distortion” (639); the scientist begins with the richness of reality, then introduces a 
distortion to examine only the causally relevant factors.  On the pragmatic account, the model is 
constructed from simple mathematical parts to generate an answer to a practical question.  We then learn 
from the success of this tool at satisfying its function which features of the world are relevant (or not) for 
generating the phenomenon of interest. 
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however, but perhaps one about our theory of the world.  Such discrepancies can drive 
new theory formation, motivate new experiments, and correct and clarify our 
understanding of nature.  Representation does not provide the foundation for modeling 
practice, rather modeling practice helps provide the epistemic foundation for our 
knowledge of scientific truths.   
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